George Washington to New Hampshire, December 29, 1777

George Washington’s words in this letter represent a stirring plea for help at the darkest moment of the American Revolution. As few other documents do, this famous letter illustrates Valley Forge as an icon of American perseverance and resolve in the face of cruel fortune and overwhelming odds.

This circular letter depicts Washington at his most impressive. This version, which was sent to all the states except Georgia, notes Washington’s urgency; his shocking, but compassionate, description of the plight of his troops, and his stern but considered warnings of the consequences of failure.

After ten days encamped at Valley Forge, Washington transmitted returns to the New Hampshire legislature. Noting "how deficient, – how exceedingly short they are of the complement of men which…they ought to have," the commander-in-chief proceeds to detail the urgent need for additional troops and supplies.

Washington opens by importuning the New Hampshire legislature to take "early and vigorous measures" to raise more men. The outcome of the war, he stresses, depends on it.

Should we have a respectable force to commence an early Campaign with, before the Enemy are reinforced, I trust we shall have an Opportunity of striking a favourable and an happy stroke; but if we should be obliged to defer it, It will not be easy to describe with any degree of precision what disagreable [sic] consequences may result from It.

The troop returns originally enclosed with each of the circular letters had been requested by Washington in his general orders of 25 December and have not been located. However, in an entry in the New York papers, Governor George Clinton records the December 1777 figures for eleven states. To reach the strength recommended by Congress, the states needed to raise more than 30,000 additional troops (1609 from Connecticut, 431 from Delaware, 6470 from Massachusetts, 3520 from Maryland, 1705 from New Jersey, 1397 from New York, 5044 from North Carolina, 4791 from Pennsylvania, 758 from Rhode Island, 4932 from Virginia, and 1649 from New Hampshire). The 1777 Pennsylvania campaign had closed with a stalemate. Though defeated at Brandywine on 11 September, the outnumbered Continental Army had at least managed to slow down the inexorable progress of the British toward Philadelphia. Fifteen days later, however, Howe and his men occupied the city. On 4 October, the Americans and British clashed briefly at Germantown. Both sides were then forced by weather to encamp for the winter.

Washington’s generals had recommended three encampment options: Wilmington, Delaware, Reading, Pennsylvania or Valley Forge. The latter site, about twenty miles from Philadelphia, offered several advantages: It was close enough to the British camp to allow for observation while still providing room to maneuver, it offered a fair defensive position, and it provided cover for the towns of Lancaster and York, where the state government and Continental Congress, respectively, had moved after the evacuation of Philadelphia. Given those factors, Washington settled on Valley Forge.

The suffering of the soldiers at Valley Forge, and Washington’s desperate attempts to rally Congress and the states to their aid, has become legend. This was the first large, prolonged winter encampment that the Continental Army endured – nine thousand men were quartered at Valley Forge for a six-month period. During that time, some two thousand American soldiers died from cold, hunger and disease. The troops that survived emerged seasoned and disciplined, a far cry from the untrained band of men that had straggled into the camp during the bitter December of 1777.

The commander-in-chief’s call to the states did not immediately resolve the problems. By February 1778, Washington’s troops were suffering some of the worst privations of the war. "A prospect now opens of absolute want," Washington wrote again to Congress, "such as will make it impossible to keep the Army much longer from dissolution…" (Washington to Henry Champion, 7 February 1778). Washington continued to complain bitterly to Congress; Congress pressured the states for more assistance. Meanwhile, the troops suffered – and died.

Much of the supply shortage was due to the incompetence of Quartermaster General Thomas Mifflin, who had resigned in November 1777, leaving his department in shambles. Finally, acknowledging "complaints from every quarter" (Washington to George Clinton, 12 March 1778, GLC 639.30), Washington appointed Nathanael Greene to the quartermaster general post. Under Greene, one of Washington’s best generals, the supply situation greatly improved.

While the troops suffered at Valley Forge, the farmers of Pennsylvania were selling their produce to the British in Philadelphia, where they could get hard cash; New York grain was going to New England civilians and British troops in and around New York City; private contractors reaped a golden harvest by sending hundreds of government wagons north of Pennsylvania loaded with flour and iron while pork in New Jersey awaiting shipment to the army spoiled for lack of transport (Boatner, 1137).

The unsavory practice infuriated Washington. In a message to Major General Lord Stirling, written one day before this letter, Washington approved of harsh punishment for such offenders, in hopes that it would "strike a Terror" that would prevent the illicit commerce (GLC 5286).

George Washington scholar John C. Fitzpatrick has pointed out that, of the three versions of this letter in the Library of Congress, "no one…is exactly like the other two in word arrangement, capitalization, or spelling, while all three are in agreement in ideas and sense. It therefore follows that it is impossible for any one text to absolutely agree with every one of the surviving circulars" (Washington to the New Hampshire Convention et al, 29 December, Fitzpatrick, Note 2). The George Washington Papers echoes that assessment, detailing the key differences between the surviving copies. (The version printed in the Papers was the one sent to New York’s George Clinton.) This document is no exception, differing in several respects from those sent to the other states.

Notably, neither the letterbook transcript (GW Papers, Series 3c Varick Transcripts), nor the Maryland, Massachusetts or Connecticut versions include a key phrase that appears in this document (GLC 3706), at the end of the second page. In discussing the potential for war between France and Britain, Washington observes that "I do not mean that such an Idea ought to be discouraged among the people at large because the event is probable." Though this last phrase appears, like the rest of the letter, to be in Robert Hanson Harrison’s hand, it has clearly been added at a later point. Did Washington opt to add this statement at the last moment, perhaps concerned that he had sounded too pessimistic a note on the prospects of war between the two European powers? Did he feel a particular need to boost the hopes of some legislatures, including that of New Hampshire, by stressing that such an event was probable? In either case, this and other textual modifications demonstrate the care and consideration taken by Washington in drafting these critical requests.

-Gilder Lehrman Collection Staff

Head Qrs: Valley Forge Dec 29th: 1777

I take the liberty of transmitting you the Inclosed Return, which contains a state of the New Hampshire Regiments. By this you will discover how deficient, – how exceedingly short they are of the complement of men which of right according to the establishment they ought to have. This information, I have thought it my duty to lay before you, that it may have that attention which it’s importance demands; and in full hope, that the most early and vigorous measures will be adopted, not only to make the Regiments more respectable but compleat. The necessity and expediency of this procedure are too obvious to need Arguments. Should we have a respectable force to commence an early Campaign with, before the Enemy are reinforced, I trust we shall have an Opportunity of striking a favourable and an happy stroke; but if we should be obliged to defer it, It will not be easy to describe with any degree of precision what disagreable consequences may result from It. We may rest assured, that Britain will strain every nerve to send from Home and abroad, [2] as early as possible, All the Troops it shall be in her power to raise or procure. Her views and schemes for subjugating these States, and bringing them under her despotic rule will be unceasing and unremitted. Nor should we, in my opinion, turn our expectations to, or have the least dependance on the intervention of a Foreign War. Our wishes on this head have been disappointed hitherto and perhaps it may long be the case. However, be this as it may, our reliance should be wholly on our own strength and exertions. If in addition to these, there should be aid derived from a War between the Enemy and any of the European Powers, our situation will be so much the better. If not our Efforts & Exertions will have been the more necessary and indispensable. For my own part, I should be happy, if the idea of a Foreign rupture should be thrown entirely out of our Scale of politicks, and that it may not have the least weight in our public measures. No bad effects could flow from it, but on the contrary many of a salutary nature. At the same time I do not mean that such an Idea ought to be discouraged among the people at large because the event is probable. [3]

There is one thing more to which I would take the liberty of solliciting your most serious and constant attention; to wit, the cloathing of your Troops, and the procuring of every possible supply in your power from time to time for that end. If the several States exert themselves in future in this instance, and I think they will, I hope that the Supplies they will be able to furnish in aid of those, which Congress may immediately import themselves, will be equal and competent to every demand. If they do not, I fear, I am satisfied the Troops will never be in a situation to answer the public expectation and perform the duties required of them. No pains, no efforts on the part of the States can be too great for this purpose. It is not easy to give you a just and accurate idea of the sufferings of the Army at large – of the loss of men on this account. Were they to be minutely detailed, your feelings would be wounded, and the relation would probably be not received without a degree of doubt & discredit. We had in Camp, on the 23rd Inst. by a Field Return then taken, not less than 2898 men unfit for duty, by reason of their being barefoot and otherwise naked. Besides this number, sufficiently distressing of itself, [4] there are many Others detained in Hospitals and crowded in Farmers Houses for the same causes. In a most particular manner, I flatter myself the care and attention of the States will be directed to (the) supply of Shoes, Stockings and Blankets, as their expenditure from the common operations and accidents of War is far greater than of any other articles. In a word, the United and respective exertions of the States cannot be too great, too vigorous in this interesting work, and we shall never have a fair and just prospect for success till our Troops (Officers & Men) are better appointed and provided than they are or have been. We have taken post here for the Winter, as a place best calculated to cover the Country from the Ravages of the Enemy and are now busily employed in erecting Huts for the Troops. This circumstance renders it the more material that the Supplies should be greater and more immediate than if the men were in comfortable Quarters.

Before I conclude, I would also add, that it will be essential to inoculate the Recruits or Levies, as fast as they are raised that their earliest services may be had. Should this be postponed, the work [5] the work will be to do most probably at an interesting and critical period, and when their aid may be very materially wanted.

I have the Honor to be with great respect Gentln. Your most Obed Servt Go: Washington

GLC03706, George Washington to New Hampshire, 29 December 1777.

For a list of other documents written by George Washington in the Gilder Lehrman Collection, click here. For more information or to obtain copies, contact Ana Ramirez-Luhrs at reference@gilderlehrman.com or call (212) 787-6616 ext. 209.

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