[struck:
DECLARATION] [inserted: Preliminary Statement]
OF THE ASSOCIATION OF
MANHATTAN DISTRICT SCIENTISTS
[struck: COLUMBIA AREA] [inserted:
New York City Area] |
We, the members of the [struck: MDSCA] [inserted:
Association] feel a very special responsibility to the people
of America because of the role we have had in developing the
atomic bomb and because of our special awareness of the possibilities
of atomic energy for the advance of our civilization or its
utter destruction. At the present time when policies on the
future development of atomic energy processes for military
and industrial purposes are still in the stage of being formulated,
it is particularly important for us to indicate the grave
danger that lies ahead and the catastrophic results that may
eventually follow a wrong decision by the leaders of our government.
We are of the opinion that a wrong decision may easily be
made if the issues are not carefully analyzed and discussed
with competent authorities.
The first object of the [struck: MDSCA] [inserted:
Association] is to supply information which will help clarify
some of the problems which have been publicly discussed in
terms of vague notions without basis in scientific fact. The
first of these problems is that of Secrecy.
Secrecy:
It has been urged by some that the “secret of the
atomic bomb” be kept by the United States, Great Britain
and Canada. It must be pointed out strongly in answer to this
proposal that:
(a) There is no “secret of the atomic bomb”,
but only a large number of solutions to detailed technical
problems. These problems can be solved in a few years by any
competent group of scientists. In view of our own rapid success
and the publication of details of our methods in the Smyth
Report, it is likely that other major powers will have atomic
bomb plants within a few years whether they know our technical
secrets or not. It is a matter of their developing the necessary
scientific and industrial “know how”. A considerable
amount of work in this direction has already been done, as
is evidenced by publications in scientific journals.
(b) Secrecy will act as a deterrent to scientific research
and development in the United States.
The secrecy which surrounded the development of the atomic
bomb in this country has been widely publicized. This secrecy
was dictated by the urgency of the war situation and by competition
with the enemy. It was accepted by scientists as a form of
discipline imposed by the war. Such secrecy is opposed to
all the principles upon which healthy scientific progress
is founded. These are: a wide spread exchange of information
and ideas among working scientists, and the freedom of any
scientist to work on any problem which attracts his interest.
Continued secrecy in the field of nuclear physics will severely
curtail the [2] formulation of new ideas by restricting the
number of scientists who will be able to work in the field,
and by restricting the free exchange of ideas. It is a safe
assumption that the majority of American scientists will not
be willing to work under these conditions. Furthermore, if
we adopt a policy of secrecy, other countries will be forced
to follow suit. The result will be that research in nuclear
physics will degenerate into a form of international competition.
The resulting loss to the United States is amply demonstrated
by the contribution to the development of the atomic bomb
made by scientists of many nationalities.
(c) Secrecy will inevitably lead to an atomic armaments
race:
Under any conditions a large part of the scientific and industrial
development of any great power will be directed toward the
utilization of nuclear energy. A policy of secrecy is bound
to lead to one of suspicion. Scientists of other countries
will be spurred on to develop atomic bombs of their own in
self-defense. This in turn, will lead to further emphasis
on the military applications on our own part. The result will
be an armaments race, with all its disastrous possibility.
The second large problem raised by the atomic bomb is that
of its tremendous destructive possibilities. During
the war years, all of our effort on the application of nuclear
energy has been directed towards its destructive possibilities.
Although much has been written about the wonderful new age
on which we are about to enter, there is very little scientific
information available on the subject of the constructive possibilities
of the utilization of nuclear energy. However, we have been
made strongly aware of the dangers inherent in the mishandling
of this tremendous force by the peoples of the world. We have
seen in the case of Hiroshima and Nagasaki that one crude,
pioneering atomic bomb is sufficient to destroy a city of
medium size. It is certain that further development will result
in bombs of vastly greater destructive potential. The Pearl
Harbor attack which destroyed most of our Pacific Fleet may
be dwarfed in a future war by a disaster in which as much
as a quarter of our population and the major part of our industry
will suddenly disappear. This may even be a conservative estimate
of the damage that will occur before we are in a position
to retaliate, if retaliation be any longer possible. It will
be a small consolation to have the largest supply of the world’s
best bombs; it may be too late to use them. It is possible
that we may not even know who our attackers are.
It is obvious that the destructive potentialities of the
atomic bomb raises certain social, political and military
problems. Although we do not feel that it is within our province
to offer detailed answers to these problems, we feel it desirable
to state them. In the absence of any adequate method of controlling
the development and use of atomic bombs, it would be necessary
for this country to take steps to minimize or counteract the
possible disastrous consequences of the use of atomic bombs
by an enemy power. These steps may be defensive or offensive.
The defensive [3] measures would of necessity include:
(a) Intensive research and development of methods for
preventing atomic bombs from being dropped either by plane
or by rockets. Experience in the recent war has indicated
the difficulty of total defensive measures. Although it is
likely that methods of defense will be developed, the problem
of preventing any atomic bombs from reaching us would seem
to pose great difficulties – and it must be remembered
that a small number of bombs could cause tremendous damage.
(b) Large military and naval potential: It must be
emphasized that the atomic bomb is a weapon most effectively
used against the civilian population localized in heavily
industrial areas. It would be used primarily against our production
centers. We could no longer rely heavily on our ability to
out-produce the enemy in the period following the outbreak
of war. It would be necessary to have large amounts of war
potential immediately available on the outbreak of war. That
is, we would be forced to live in a perpetual state of preparation,
not to mention fear. Furthermore, it is highly doubtful that
the atomic bomb would “make large armies obsolete”.
On the contrary, it would probably be necessary to maintain
a large standing army to repel possible invasion after an
atomic bomb attack.
(c) Decentralization of large cities and industrial areas:
The necessity for such decentralization is obvious in view
of the enormous destructive potentialities of the atomic bomb.
The social and economic problems involved in such a process
would be of a magnitude of hitherto unconsidered and the time
required may be too long for such a measure to be effective.
In contrast to the defensive measures outlined, certain
offensive measures may be suggested. Among these are:
(a) The manufacture of more, bigger, and better bombs
than those possessed by any other nation: It has already
been pointed out that in the event of a sudden onslaught by
an enemy power, enormous damage may be done before we can
retaliate. Furthermore, such retaliation even if possible,
would leave a world in which the extent of destruction would
make that of the recent war appear negligible. In any case,
we would live in a world of suspicion, fear and even panic,
where the temptation of a great initial advantage would be
difficult for an aggressively-minded power to resist.
(b) Preventive Conquest: We might attempt to guarantee
American security by a preventive conquest of all other nations
which are potential rivals. This possibility is not only morally
untenable, but virtually impossible of realization. It would
have to be undertaken immediately to have any chance of success.
At the present time the great majority of the American people
would be opposed to a war of aggression. Several years of
relentless propaganda and indoctrination of the youth were
required before even Nazi Germany could embark on its program
of world conquest. [4] Lacking totalitarian techniques and
fighting against the American tradition of fair play as well
as the present war-weariness, the advocates of a policy of
world conquest cannot hope to prepare the American people
psychologically for a war against any other major power, much
less against all other large nations, for some time to come.
Within a few years, however, other nations will have atomic
armaments and it will then be too late.
Notes: This document is part of a twenty-three page scrapbook
on controlling atomic power, created by scientists Irving
Kaplan and Francis Bonner. Kaplan and Bonner’s scrapbook
also includes an earlier, handwritten draft of the Association’s
statement.
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